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THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO SUE OUT A WRIT
OF ERROR IN CRIMINAL CASES
THOMAS J. JOHNSON, JR.1
T HE question of the right of the state to sue out a
writ of error to reverse a judgment quashing an in-
dictment has arisen often in recent years and is of vital
importance to modern criminal practice. Today, the peo-
ple's right to sue out a writ of error is largely controlled
by statutes in the several states. Whether such right
vests in the state by statute or by judicial interpretation
of constitutional authority is immaterial, but it is a right
that should be recognized. Its necessity and importance
cannot be minimized.
To deny the state the right of a writ of error would
be to hinder and in some instances thwart the people in
the successful prosecution of crime. It would be possible
for a judge motivated by friendship or political interests
to free defendants without much personal censure. If
the indictment was quashed, and if the statute of limi-
tations ran against the crime or the state was unable to
draft another indictment that would more fully meet
with the desires of the presiding judge, the defendant
would go free, thus depriving society of its prerogative
of seeing that one of its members charged with crime,
and rightfully so charged, was brought to trial. Crime
would go unpunished, and the people would stand by
without the adequate remedy of presenting the question
to the supreme judicial tribunal of the state.
At no time does this discussion extend to cases where
there has been a determination of the issues. We are
heartily in accord with the principle which prohibits dou-
ble jeopardy, as recognized in the various state consti--
tutions similar to the Illinois Constitution of 1870, Sec-
1 Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois; alumnus of Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law.
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tion 10 of Article II of the Bill of Rights, which provides
that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to give evidence against himself, or be twice put in jeop-
ardy for the same offence." Only those instances.
where a writ of error is sought to reverse a judgment
quashing an indictment are considered here.
States whose statutes authorize writs of error by the
people have no difficulty. However, in states which have
no such statutory provisions, it is a disputed question
to what extent such power vests in the supreme courts
under their respective state constitutions.
Constitutional language can be interpreted safely only
by reference to the common law of England.' If at com-
mon law the Crown as well as the convicted defendant
had the right to sue out a writ of error, certainly the
framers of our constitutions in authorizing the supreme
courts to entertain writs of error must have intended
those sued out by the people as well as those sued out by
the defendants. The old English commentators of the
common law all seem to be in accord with the theory that
the Crown could sue out a writ of error to reverse a
judgment of a nisi prius court quashing an indictment.
Lord Coke said :3
It appeareth in Vantes case that if a man be erroneously ac-
quitted of felony by verdict and judgment thereupon given, yet
if the indictment be insufficient, he may be indicted again for
the reasons and causes in that case reported,... and in the case
of an erroneous judgment of acquittal that no writ of error
needeth to be brought by the King, but the offendor may be
newly indicted.
The lack of necessity on the part of the Crown to bring
a writ of error in such a case would imply that it would
have been permissible had the necessity arisen. Bacon,
2 People v. Board of Trade, 193 Ill. 577; People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146;
Ex-Parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87.
8 Third Institutes of the Laws of England, 214.
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in his abridgement of the edition of 1846," states that
the Crown may have new trials in certain cases. A writ
of error would, of course, have been necessary to reverse
the former decision.
In his work on criminal law, Chitty declares that where
a verdict is obtained by the fraud of the defendant, or
in consequence of irregularities in the proceedings, a
new trial may be granted,5 and that a writ of error orig-
inally issued in any case only at the fiat of the Crown.6
That "writs of error seem allowable to the Crown in
criminal cases" is stated by Bishop in his criminal law
treatise.7
One of the greatest of the chief justices of England,
Lord Hale, says in his celebrated Historia Placitorum
Coronae," that in the case of a special-verdict where an
erroneous judgment of acquittal is given, yet it is con-
clusive against the Crown "till the judgment be reversed
by error," and also that a prisoner could never be ar-
raigned again after acquittal despite the insufficiency
of the indictment "till the judgment of acquittal were re-
versed." 9 He also says that if in Vaux's case the judg-
ment had been quod eat inde quietus the defendant
could never have been indicted again for the same of-
fense despite the defective indictment, "till that judg-
ment reversed by writ of error."110
These statements of Lord Hale were quoted with ap-
proval by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in a case de-
cided in 1804.11 They alone were held to be sufficient
authority for authorizing a writ of error at the suit of
the state to review a judgment of a nisi prius court
quashing an indictment.
4 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law, IX, 628.
5 A Practical Treatise on The Criminal Law, I, 657.
6 Ibid, I, 747.
7 New Commentaries on the Criminal Law, (9th Ed.), I, see. 1024.
8 (lst American Ed.) IIU, 248.
9 Ibid., II3 394.
10 Ibid., II, 395.
11 State v. Buchannan, 5 Harr. & J. 317.
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It has been contended that the existence of this right
in the Crown was merely for the purpose of bringing up
a record for the review of errors appearing on the face
of the record. This is the import of the language used
by Lord Mansfield in the case of Rex v. Wilkes :12
Till the third of Queen Ann a writ of error in any criminal case
was held to be merely ex gratia.... But in the third of Queen
Ann ten of the judges were of opinion "that in all cases under
treason and felony, a writ of error was not merely of grace; but
ought to be granted." . . . It cannot issue now without a fiat
from the Attorney General, who always examines whether it be
sought merely for delay, or upon a probable error .... In a mis-
demeanor, if there be probable cause, it ought not to be denied:
this Court would order the Attorney General to grant his flat.
But be the error ever so manifest in treason or felony, the King's
pleasure to deny the writ is conclusive.
Again, in a case18 decided in 1868, it was held:
The granting of a writ of error is part of the prerogative of the
Crown. If, therefore, the Attorney General of England, or the
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland refuse to grant it, the Lord Chan-
cellor has no jurisdiction to review that decision.
This language would imply that the writ was used at com-
mon law by the Crown only for the purpose of showing
favor to a subject convicted where the king was will-
ing that the conviction be reversed.
However, such inference is contradicted by many com-
mon law cases which we have examined. The case of
Rex v. Walcott'4 was decided in the seventh year of the
reign of William and Mary. Here the Crown sought a
writ of error from the House of Lords to reverse the
judgment of the Court of King's Bench which had re-
versed a conviction for treason. A long and extended
argument resulted in an affirmance of the judgment of
the Court of King's Bench.
12 4 Burr. 2527.
18 In re Piggott, 11 Cox, Cr. Cas. 311.
14 Shower P. C. 127.
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In another case, 15 decided in the same year, the Crown
sought a writ of error from the House of Lords to re-
verse the judgment of the Court of King's Bench re-
versing a judgment of conviction of high treason entered
at Oyer and Terminer. Here again, after considering
the precedents of the law, the judgment of the Court of
King's Bench was affirmed.
In both these cases the writ of error was sought by the
Crown to sustain a conviction had in the lower court, and
not for the purpose of showing favor to a convicted de-
fendant. The Court of King's Bench sitting as an in-
termediary appellate court reversed these convictions for
irregularities in imposing the sentences. In both in-
stances the judgment questioned by writ of error was a
judgment in favor of the defendants, and against the
Crown.
Only one common law case have we found where the
right of the attorney general to sue out a writ of error
from the judgment of a trial court quashing an indict-
ment was directly decided.16 Here a writ of certiorari
was sued out by the Crown to reverse an order entered
at quarter sessions quashing an indictment. The Court
of Queen's Bench discharged the rule, and Mr. Justice
Coleridge stated that he was satisfied the trial court had
authority to quash, that the question on certiorari was
simply one of jurisdiction, and that he would not for
one moment examine whether it exercised its power
rightly or not. He then said, "If a writ of error be
brought we shall inquire whether what the Sessions did
was erroneous or not."
In all other cases examined, the right of the Crown to
sue out a writ of error to reverse the judgment of a nisi
prius court quashing an indictment was never questioned.
This may be argued as authority for the proposition that
such writs at common law issued as a matter of course.
Such would be the inference of the Tucker and Walcott
15 Rex v. Tucker, Shower P. 0. 186.
16 Regina v. Wilson, 6 Q. B. 620.
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cases previously cited. These two cases, decided at a time
when they created nation-wide interest, and participated
in by the greatest jurists of the realm, never once ques-
tioned the right of the Crown to sue out a writ of error.
Likewise, in the case of Rex v. Davis,'17 this right was
not questioned. Here the Crown sought a writ of error
from the Court of King's Bench to reverse a judgment
below. The Court of King's Bench refused the writ and
held that the verdict sought to be reversed was only
against the evidence and was not sought to set aside the
verdict because of fraud. The opinion cites two instances
of reversals where the acquittals were obtained by fraud.
In the very celebrated case of Regina v. Millis,8 the
record of which covers 373 pages, the right of a Pres-
byterian minister to perform a valid marriage in Ire-
land was questioned. Here the Crown sued out a writ
of error from the House of Lords to reverse the judg-
ment of the court of Queen's Bench in Ireland reversing
a conviction of the defendant Millis had at the Spring
Assizes of 1842 for the county of Antrim. The hear-
ing of this writ was participated in by such famous Eng-
lish jurists and statesmen as Lord Coleridge, Lord
Brougham, and Lord Ellenborough. Never once in the
lengthy report is the slightest doubt raised as to the
right of the Crown to sue out such a writ.
A writ of error in Regina v. Houston9 was sued out by
the Crown from the Court of Queen's Bench to reverse
the judgment of the Summer Assizes of 1840 for the
county of Antrim in Ireland, at which Assize an indict-
ment had been quashed on demurrer. The Court of
Queen's Bench did reverse the judgment. Here again,
the right of the Crown to sue out a writ of error was not
questioned.
In the case of Regina v. Chadwick,20 a writ of error
was sued out by the Crown to reverse a judgment of ac-
17 12 Mod. 8.
18 10 C1. & Fin. 534.
192 Craw. & D. 191.
20 11 Q. B. 173 and 11 Q. B. 205.
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quittal entered on a special verdict at Oyer and Ter-
miner. Here the defendant was charged with bigamy,
and he made the defense that his first wife was a sister
of a deceased wife. This question excited considerable in-
terest at the time, for the sole test of liberalism was be-
lieved to be the right to marry a sister of a deceased wife.
The Court of Queen's Bench, after a full consideration,
affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Nor was the
right of the Court of Queen's Bench to entertain a writ
of error sought by the Crown questioned.
Among the early records on this subject in the United
States widely diverse opinions are found. The earlier
-and apparently the better reasoned view-followed
the Court of Appeals of Maryland which, in 1804, held
that the state had the right to appeal from a judgment
quashing an indictment. 1 States that took a contrary
position followed New York's stand, established in 1848,
where the state was denied the right to sue out a writ of
error after an indictment was quashed.
2
The diversity of the two positions necessitates a fur-
ther consideration of the cases themselves to determine
whether the decisions are based on statutes or are inter-
pretations of constitutional authority.
The Maryland case was the first decision in America
dealing with this question. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland was asked to issue a writ of error by the state
to reverse the judgment of the Harford County Court
sustaining a demurrer to an indictment for conspiracy.
The Court of Appeals expressed itself so clearly and
forcefully-both as to the common law and as to the
reasons for its decision-that it seems worth while to
quote a portion of the opinion:
This case was brought up by a writ of error directed to the
Judges of Harford County Court; and it has been strongly
urged that a writ of error will not lie at the instance of the state
21 State v. Buchannan, 5 Harr. & J. 317.
22 People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9.
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in a criminal prosecution, and therefore that the writ in this case
was improvidently sued out and ought to be quashed. But it is
said in [2] Hale's P. C. 247, the authority of which it is diffi-
cult to question, and indeed we require none higher, "that if A.
be indicted of murder or other felony, and plead non cul., and
a special verdict found, and the Court do erroneously adjudge
it to be no felony; yet so long as that judgment stands unre-
versed by writ of error, if the prisoner be indicted de novo, he
may plead autrefois acquit, and shall be discharged; but if the
judgment be reversed, the party may be indicted de novo." And
this is not a loose dictum, but it is laid down and repeated as text
law; for on page 248 it is stated that "in the case of the special
verdict above, where an erroneous judgment of acquittal is
given, yet it is conclusive to the King till it be reversed by
error." . . . Hence it is manifest that, in the opinion of Lord
Hale, the King might have a writ of error in a criminal case,
since it would be absurd to say that a man who had obtained a
judgment of acquittal for a defect in the indictment, or on a
special verdict, could never again be indicted for the same of-
fense until that judgment was reversed by writ of error, if a
writ of error would not lie. Fortified by such authority alone,
in the absence of any legislative provision in this State on the
subject, we think we might safely say, without further inquiry,
that the writ of error in this case was properly sued out ...
And there is no sufficient reason why the State should not be
entitled to a writ of error in a criminal case. It is perhaps a
right that should be seldom exercised, and never for the purpose
of oppression, or without necessity; which can rarely, and it is
supposed would never happen, and would not be tolerated by
public feeling. But as the State has no interest in the punish-
ment of an offender, except for the purpose of general justice
connected with the public welfare, no such abuse is to be ap-
prehended; and as the power of revision is calculated to pro-
duce a uniformity of decision, it is right and proper that the
writ should lie for the State, in the same proportion as it is
essential to the due administration of justice that the criminal
law of the land should be certain and known, as well for the
government of Courts and information to the people, as for a
guide to juries; who though (by the laws and practice of the
State) they have a right to judge both of the law and of the
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fact, in criminal prosecutions, should, and usually do, respect
the opinions and. advice of Judges on questions of law, and
would seldom be found to put themselves in opposition to the
decisions of the supreme judicial tribunal of the State.
23
This decision was handed down at a time when there
was no statute in Maryland authorizing such a practice.
The first such statute was passed in 1872.24 The deci-
sion is therefore a clear interpretation of the authority
granted by the constitution in using the words "writs
of error."I
North Carolina allowed a writ of error sought by the
state. In the case of State v. Haddock,25 a writ of error
sought by the state to reverse a judgment of the county
court arresting a judgment was allowed. The court held
that a writ of error would lie for the state as well as for
the defendant. Likewise in the case of State v. Lane,-
decided in 1878, the right of the state to sue out a writ
of error independent of any statute was found to exist
in two instances-where judgment is on a special verdict,
and where judgment is on a motion to quash, or on a de-
murrer.
The first statute in North Carolina granting this right
to the state was passed in 1883.27 This statute provides
that the state may appeal in four instances; where judg-
ment is for the defendant on a special verdict, on de-
murrer, on motion to quash, or in arrest of judgment.
Following the statute, the cases of State v. Ewing et al.2
and State v. Robinson 9 declared the constitutionality of
the statute and held that the state might appeal from a
judgment of acquittal erroneously entered on a special
verdict.
23 State v. Buchannan, 5 Harr. & J. 317.
24 Now Vol. I, Art, V, sec. 86, p. 251 of The Annotated Code of Mary-
land.
25 3 N. C. 162.
26 78 N. C. 547.
27 Code of March 2, 1883, sec. 1237, now contained in Statutes of North
Carolina, Ch. 83, Art. XVi, see. 4649.
28 108 N. C. 755.
29 116 N. C. 1046.
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Pennsylvania likewise followed this rule. In Com-
monwealth v. Taylor,3 0 decided in 1812, a judgment was
reversed and the cause remanded by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania upon a writ of error brought by the
commonwealth to reverse the judgment of a nisi prius
court arresting a judgment. In Commonwealth v. Capp,
31
decided in 1864, it was likewise held that the common-
wealth had power to sue out a writ of error petitioned
to reverse the judgment of the lower court sustaining
a demurrer to an indictment. The first statute in Penn-
sylvania allowing the state to sue out a writ of error was
passed in 1874,82 some sixty years after the decision in
Commonwealth v. Taylor, and ten years after the deci-
sion in Commonwealth v. Capp. This statute could have
had no effect on the decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in either of the above cases.
South Carolina, in the case of State v. Young,33 de-
cided in 1889, followed this rule. The Supreme Court, in
holding that the state might sue out a writ of error in a
criminal case, said, "In such a case we do not see any
satisfactory reason why the state's attorney, in the dis-
charge of his official duty, may not appeal in behalf of
the state." There appears to be no statute in South
Carolina either granting or denying this right of appeal
to the state.
New Jersey, in the case of State v. Meyer,34 allowed
the state to sue out a writ of error. The Court of Ap-
peals and Errors of New Jersey, after discussing the
early authorities of the English common law, some of
which have been previously discussed, and after citing
a number of cases where a writ of error was issuable by
30 14 Pa. 277.
31 48 Pa. St. 53.
32 Now Pennsylvania St., Law 1920, see. 561, p. 53.
33 30 S. 0. 399.
34 65 N. J. L. 233.
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the higher court at the instance of the Crown in England
to reverse a judgment in favor of the defendant in a crim-
inal case, says:
In none of these cases was a doubt intimated as to the right of
the Crown. In view of these matters, it seems almost incredible
that by the English common law the crown was not entitled to
a writ of error in criminal cases.
This issuance of a writ of error should not be confounded
with the granting of a new trial, which always rests in the dis-
cretion of the court. The rule of the English judges was to re-
fuse a new trial after the acquittal of the accused upon an in-
dictment, and the principle underlying that rule is now imbedded
in our constitution. But the acquittal there intended does not
include the reversal of a conviction for error of law.
The first statute in New Jersey allowing a writ of error
to the state was passed in 191115 many years after this
decision.
The first decided case in Tennessee on this point is the
case of State v. Reynolds.3 6 Here a writ of error was re-
fused to review an acquittal, but a number of years later,
in the case of State v. Tolls,37 the attorney general sued
out a writ of error to reverse a judgment of the Circuit
Court which refused an appeal sued out by the state to
reverse the judgment of a county court quashing pre-
sentment. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court
and held that it had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal
in such a case. This case was decided before any statute
had been passed allowing the state a writ of error.
State v. Daily" discusses the history of the practice.
This case rose on a writ of error to reverse a judgment
overruling a demurrer to a special plea filed by the de-
.35 Comp. St. of N. J., p. 2208, see. 4, errors.
36 5 Tenn. 110.
37 13 Tenn. 363.
8 6 Ind. 9.
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fendant. The Supreme Court of Indiana there points out
that the doctrine that the state might not sue out a writ
of error was a new one and was first announced in New
York in 1848. The court held that only when the defend-
ant has had a verdict and judgment of acquittal, or at
least been put on trial before the court or jury is the state
denied a writ of error. If the trial court sustained a
motion to quash an indictment the state is entitled to a
writ of error, for the defendant has not answered to the
merits, and to reverse and remand the cause did not put
him in jeopardy a second time.
In State v. Hood,3 9 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
held that, in criminal proceedings, the state has a right
to appeal from a judgment of the district court quashing
an indictment, but where the defendant has been put
upon his trial and acquitted by a jury he cannot be again
tried for the same offense. The court in State v. French
40
held that the Supreme Court of Louisiana had authority
to entertain an appeal by the state from a ruling of a
trial court sustaining a motion in arrest of judgment
and setting aside the verdict. This case was decided in
1898. Some thirty years later the first statute allowing
the state to appeal was passed.4'
Arkansas, in the case of State v. Graham,42 held that
the state might sue out a writ of error in a criminal
case, but that no person might be placed in jeopardy
twice for the same offense. This decision, rendered in
1839, was the rule in Arkansas seven years before the
first statute41 gave the right of a writ of error to the
state.
Michigan allowed a writ of error to the state. In the
case of People v. Swift, 44 decided in 1886, a petition of
39 6 La. Ann. 179.
40 50 La. Ann. 461.
41 Code of Grim. Proc., 1928, Art. 54.
42 1 Ark. 428.
43 Crawford & Moses Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, Ch. 42, sec. 2i42,
p. 714.
44 59 Mich. 529, reported as Prosecuting Attorney v. Judge of Re-
corder's Court in 26 N. W. 694.
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mandamus was asked to compel a lower court to expunge
an erroneous order quashing an indictment, and to pro-
ceed to trial on the issues. The defendant in error con-
tended that the writ of mandamus was not the proper
remedy as a writ of error was not allowable to the state.
The court, after holding that the writ of error was the
correct remedy proceeded to decide the case on the mer-
its, and in issuing the writ of mandamus said:
Under the common law and under our constitution no writ of
error or other proceeding lies on behalf of the public to review
a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, as no one can be
twice put in jeopardy; but there is no rule of law to prevent
the review of proceedings which have not gone to trial. It is
very well settled that a decision quashing an indictment may
be reviewed. The only question has been, what is the better
form of review?
At the time this case was decided the State of Michigan
was operating under the Constitution of 1850, Section
3, Article VI of which provided that, "The Supreme
Court shall have a general superintending control over
all inferior courts and shall have power to issue writs of
error, habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prece-
dendo, and other original and remedial writs and to hear
and determine the same. In all other cases it shall have
appellate jurisdiction only." The Supreme Court inter-
preted this language of the constitution to allow writs
of error to the people. The first statute on this point
in Michigan, not passed until 1917,11 gave to the state
the right of a writ of error to question the quashing of
an indictment.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in the case of State v.
Blair" held that where an indictment was erroneously
quashed, the state was entitled to an opportunity to try
out the facts in issue and vindicate its laws, and that to
prevent the arbitrary denial to the state of its right to
prosecute one properly charged with crime by the grand
45 Comp. Laws of Michigan, Vol. 3, see. 17,366, p. 6033.
46 24 Ohio App. 413.
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jury the state might sue out a writ of error. The only
statute in Ohio bearing on the question provides only for
a writ of error from a reversing appellate court to a su-
perior court.47 In this case the court relied on Section
6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution which provides
that the Court of Appeals of Ohio shall have authority to
"review, affirm, modify, or reverse the judgments of the
Court of Common Pleas, Superior Court, and other
courts of record within the district as may be provided by
law." It was by interpreting this constitutional pro-
vision that the Court of Appeals of Ohio granted the
state the right to a writ of error.
The Supreme Court of Utah has decided the question
in the same manner, holding an appeal by the state al-
lowable. In State v. Booth,48 the Supreme Court of Utah
interpreted Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution of
Utah which reads, "From all final judgments of the Dis-
trict Courts there shall be a right of appeal to the Su-
preme Court," to mean that the state as well as the de-
fendant could appeal. The question was presented on an
alternative writ of mandamus to compel the district court
judge to expunge an order dismissing a criminal case
and discharging the prisoner and his bail. The defend-
ant demurred to the petition and moved to quash the
alternative writ, contending that under the wording of
that section the state had a speedy and adequate remedy
at law, in that it had a right to appeal from the order,
it being a final one. In sustaining the demurrer the Su-
preme Court of Utah said:
Here [referring to the constitutional provision cited above]
is a plain and express provision of the fundamental law, which
grants the right of appeal "from all final judgments of the dis-
trict courts." It is mandatory and applies alike to criminal
prosecutions and civil actions. It is a limitation alike upon
the legislative and judicial powers of the government. Neither
the legislature by legislation nor the judiciary by interpretation
47Patterson's Ohio Crim. Code, sec. 13,764.
48 21 Utah 88.
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can lawfully deprive any person, natural or artificial, from this
sovereign right. The state is not made an exception, and there-
fore is included within the provision, which, in terms, is general,
the only condition imposed being that the judgment or decision
from which the appeal is taken be final. This condition exist-
ing in any case, any aggrieved party may exercise the right.
In summation, the supreme courts of twelve states, in
the opinions quoted from and the decisions cited, have
held that the state has a right to sue out a writ of error
as a matter of prerogative under the constitutions of
those states; that such right should vest in the state un-
der the constitution unless it is expressly withheld; and
that the correct interpretation of the common law mean-
ing of a writ of error is a writ of error sued out by
either a convicted defendant or the state.
Turning the discussion to those cases that deny the
state a right to a writ of error, the notable New York
decision of People v. Corning49 will first be considered.
Mr. Justice Bronson, in expressing the opinion of the
court to be that the state has no right to bring a writ of
error in a criminal case, whether the judgment reached
by the lower court was based on matters of law or on an
acquittal based on evidence, cites three cases in support
of the position taken-People v. Dill,5" State v. Reyn-
olds,5" and Commonwealth v. Harrison.
52
People v. Dill and State v. Reynolds are not authority,
for in those cases a writ of error was sought to reverse a
judgment of acquittal. Commonwealth v. Harrison was
decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1820. The
entire opinion in that case was: "Per C'riam. The
Court is unanimously of the opinion that the writ of error
improvidently issued on the part of the Commonwealth,
because no writ of error lies in a criminal case for the
Commonwealth." Virginia was then functioning under
49 2 N. Y. 9.
50 1 Scam. 257.
51 5 Tenn. 110.
52 2 Va. Cas. (4 Va.) 202.
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the Constitution of June 29, 1776, and under the stat-
utes contained in Leigh's Revised Code of Virginia, 1819,
Volumes 1 and 2. By the constitution, the jurisdiction
of the courts was in the control of the legislature. Prac-
tice and jurisdiction were controlled by Chapter 67, Re-
vised Code. The court was one of original and appellate
jurisdiction, and the right to issue a writ of error in
criminal cases was limited by the wording of the statute.
Section 26, page 224, 225, Volume 2, Revised Code, stated
that a writ of error might be sued out from any judg-
ment convicting any person. The decision in this case,
then, was based on the provision of the constitution that
made the Supreme Court of Virginia subject to the leg-
islative authority, and on the statute that limited writs
of error to convicted defendants.
These three cases are the total authority cited in Peo-
ple v. Corning in support of the court's departure from
the then universal rule that the state might sue a writ
of error to reverse a judgment quashing an indictment.
In criticizing this decision, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in the case of State v. Meyer,53 said:
With regard to the case of People v. Corning, I think that any-
one reading the opinion of Judge Bronson will perceive that
his conclusion was induced more by the supposed danger aris-
ing from the exercise of such a power by the state than by the
legal authorities for and against the possession of the power.
That his apprehensions were not shared in by the people gen-
erally was soon shown by the statute passed to confer on the
state the power denied by the court. Moreover, the decision
rendered in that case was rendered in the teeth of the previous
practice in New York and of a former decision by the same
court, given after full discussion and consideration, in People v.
De Bow, 2 N. Y. 9, note a .... These decisions are not satisfac-
tory as to the common law of England, and should not be fol-
lowed in this state, where we are accustomed to adhere closely
to common law rules that were not obsolete before the Revolu-
tion, and are not out of harmony with our institutions.
53 65 N. J. L. 233.
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The first case in Georgia denying a writ of error to
the state is State of Georgia v. Jones.54 From reading
this case we find that it was decided on the particular
wording of the statute in that state. The Supreme Court
of Georgia was a. legislative court. In construing the
statute that gave the court authority to issue writs of
error, the peculiar language of that statute necessitated
the decision. Writs of error might be sued out by any
"party" by "his" counsel. The court held that the word
"party," coupled with the pronoun "his," excluded any-
one but a natural person, and hence the state had not the
right.
The first case in Massachusetts denying this right was
the case of Commonwealth v. Cummings.55 Here a writ
of error was sought to reverse an acquittal. This case
clearly has no application to our question, but it formed
the basis for later decisions in that state. The court here
held itself to be a legislative court, made so by the con-
stitution of 1780, and while the statute was broad enough
to allow writs of error brought by convicted defendants,
the right of the state to sue out such a writ was limited
by other statutes.
Tennessee's contribution to this group is the case of
State v. Reynolds,56 where a writ of error was sued out
from an acquittal. In discussing this case, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in the case of State v. Meyer,57 said
that the Supreme Court of Tennessee confounded this
question "with the very different one of granting a new
trial after acquittal."
Wisconsin refused to allow the state to sue out a writ
of error in State v. Kemp and others,58 which was de-
cided on the authority of People v. Corning and Com-
monwea-th v. Cummings, which have already been dis-
54 7 Ga. 422.
55 57 Mass. 212.
56 5 Tenn. 110.
57 65 N. J. L. 233.
58 17 Wis. 690.
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cussed. In the opinion, the court says that the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court depended on the legislature,
and since no statutory authorization had been given to
entertain writs of error, except those by convicted de-
fendants, the writ sought here would not lie. This case,
based on authority which has been distinguished, should
carry little weight.
In 1881, the Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of
State v. Burns,59 denied the state's right to a writ of
error to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court quash-
ing an indictment. In giving this decision the court
said:
The weight of authority is overwhelming, not only in this coun-
try but in England, that the writ will not lie at the instance of
the State, and it is evident from the character of the legislation
on the subject in this State that it has never been contemplated
that the State could further pursue parties who had obtained
judgment in their favor in prosecutions by indictment, whether
by the judgment of the court or verdict of a jury.
Upon examination of this case we find it was decided
entirely on construction of the statute. The constitu-
tionality of the statute was not raised, and the decision is
based under that statute60 which limited the issuance of
writs of error to instances where "they shall issue upon
the application of the defendant."
Missouri has denied the right of the state to sue out a
writ of error in State v. Copeland.61  At the time the
Copeland case was decided, Missouri was operating un-
der the constitution of 1875, which, together with the
constitution of 1820, gave the Supreme Court general
jurisdiction. Limitations on this authority could be made
by the legislature, which right the legislature exercised
in 1845 by Sections 13 and 14 of Article VIII, Chapter
135 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, limiting the right
of the state to an appeal only.
59 18 Fla. 185.
60 Digest of the Laws of Florida, Ch. 89, sees. 3, 4.
61 65 Mo. 497.
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Colorado likewise has denied the right of the state to
sue out a writ of error. In the case of People v. Ray-
mond,62 the Supreme Court of Colorado refused a writ
of error to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals
reversing a conviction had in the district court. This
decision was rendered by a divided court of two to one,
and there was filed a strong dissenting brief by Mr.
Justice Elliott. The majority opinion was decided on
the authority of the cases already discussed.
We are not unmindful of three early Illinois cases,
People v. Dill,63 People v. Royal,4 and People v. Miner
et al.,65 that deny the right of the state to sue out a writ
of error after an acquittal. They of course have no
place in our present discussion, for the point here under
consideration was not raised.
The Supreme Court of the United States has consid-
ered this question in United States v. Moore.6  Here the
District Court for the District of Columbia had sustained
a demurrer to an indictment. A writ of error was sued
out from the Supreme Court of the United States at the
instance of the attorney general to reverse that judg-
ment. The defendant questioned the right of the Su-
preme Court to issue such a writ in a criminal case at
the request of the government. The attorney general
contended that, since the Supreme Court had appellate
jurisdiction to act in "all cases in law and equity aris-
ing under the laws of the United States," and though
the specific right to issue writs of error at the instance of
the government was not granted, still it should follow as
being necessary for the the correct exercise of appellate
jurisdiction. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in denying the
writ said:
If Congress had erected inferior courts, without saying in what
cases writ of error or appeal should lie upon such courts to this.
62 18 Colo. 242.
63 1 Scam. 257.
64 1 Scam. 557.
65 144 Ill. 308.
66 3 Cranch 159.
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your argument would be irresistible; but when the constitution
has given Congress power to limit the exercise of our juris-
diction, and to make regulations respecting its exercise; and
Congress, under that power, has proceeded to erect inferior
courts, and has said in what cases a writ of error or appeal
shall lie, an exception of all other cases is implied. And this
court is as much bound by an implied as an express exception.
In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall said that the
argument that the Supreme Court of the United States
had authority to issue writs at the instance of the gov-
ernment would have been irresistible were it not for the
fact that Congress was given power to limit that juris-
diction and had exercised its power to the exclusion of
writs of error sought by the government. His opinion
is authority for the doctrine that where a supreme court
is created by constitutional authority and its powers are
not limited by the constitution or made subject to the
legislature, or, being made subject to the legislature, the
latter has not exercised its power to the exclusion of
writs of error, then that supreme court has as part of
its powers the right to issue writs of error to the state to
reverse the judgment of an inferior court quashing an
indictment.
This exact question has very recently been presented
to the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of People v.
Barber.17  The state here sued out a -writ of error to re-
verse the judgment of the Criminal Court of Cook
County, which sustained a motion to quash an indict-
ment for bigamy against the defendant in error. In
quashing the indictment, the trial court held that it did
not describe the parties or the subject matter with suf-
ficient certainty. It was not contended by either party
that the defendant had at any time been placed in jeop-
ardy.
In suing out this writ of error the state contended that
the statute" was unconstitutional. The portion applica-
ble is as follows:
67 348 Ill. 40.
68 Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. St. (1931), Ch. 38, par. 747, Criminal Code,
Div. XIII, see. 17.
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Exceptions may be taken in criminal cases, and bills of excep-
tions shall be signed and sealed by the judge, and entered of
record, and error may be assigned thereon by the defendant, the
same as in civil cases: Provided, that in no criminal case shall
the people be allowed an appeal, writ of error or new trial.
The state based its contention on the argument that
Section 2 and Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitu-
tion of 1870, which the Supreme Court has held must be
construed together,69 made the Supreme Court a consti-
tutional court in so far as criminal cases, and cases in-
volving a freehold, a franchise, or the validity of a stat-
ute were concerned ;70 that as a constitutional court in
these instances the legislature was without power to limit
the jurisdiction granted by the constitution; that Sec-
tion 17 was unconstitutional in that it attempted to limit
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the issuance of
writs of error to those sought by defendants only.
In a lengthy and very learned opinion Mr. Justice Orr
denied the right of the state to sue out a writ of error
in a criminal case, holding that the legislature was given
power by the constitution to limit the authority of the
Supreme Court, and that Section 17 did not conflict with
the constitution and was valid. The Supreme Court in
this decision cited with approval the New York case of
People v. Corning, and expressed itself in accord with the
doctrine there laid down.
In this paper we have discussed common law authori-
ties, all of which are generally in accord, allowing the
right of the Crown to sue out a writ of error. We have
considered the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the import of which is that such a right
does exist as a part of the common law authority of a
supreme court unless it is made subject to the legisla-
ture and the legislature has exercised its power to the
69 Chicago and Alton R. R. Co. v. Fisher, 141 Ill. 614.
70 McGinnis v. McGinnis, 289 Ill. 608; Bagdonas v. Liberty Land &
Investment Co., 309 I. 103; Brown v. Kienstra, 337 11. 641.
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exclusion of writ of error by the state. Among the states,
we have discussed decisions of twelve states in which this
principle of the common law is unconditionally adopted
as a true one, and further, is incorporated as a part of
the laws in these states, granting the people the right to
present a ruling of a trial court quashing an indictment
to the supreme court for a final determination.
The authorities denying the right of the state to sue
out a writ of error may be summarized as follows: twelve
states have held that the state cannot sue out a writ of
error; of these, the decisions in four states concerned
the right of the state to sue out a writ of error to re-
verse an acquittal; the courts of another four states
based their decision on their own peculiar statutory con-
struction; and the other four states, New York, Colo-
rado, Missouri, and Illinois, hold that the state cannot
sue out a writ of error, citing as authority cases coming
under either of the two previous groups. It would ap-
pear that the courts deciding in favor of this right did so
on better reasoning and authority.
The right to sue out a writ of error is a right the state
should have in order to insure the full protection of our
laws to society, and to guarantee the people against fur-
ther miscarriage of justice. Whether this right is rec-
ognized by the courts through interpretation of the in-
tent of the framers of our constitutions, recognizing it
as part of the common law authority of the respective
supreme courts, or whether the right is granted by the
legislature through the passage of laws allowing the state
to present to the supreme courts questions of the va-
lidity of indictments, is immaterial, as long as it is rec-
ognized. The right of the state to sue out a writ of
error from a judgment quashing an indictment should be
made a part of the sovereign law of every state in the
Union.
